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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
23 October 1963**

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT: African Reactions to US Positions in Security Council Debates on Portuguese Territories and South Africa**

1. Available evidence suggests that the US did not lose any significant amount of its credit with African countries by virtue of the positions taken on the resolutions dealing with the Portuguese territories and South Africa at the UN Security Council last summer. At the end of the sessions African delegations in New York reflected some frustration and even resentment that the results were not more far reaching. This was especially true of the four cabinet ministers from Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, and the Malagasy Republic who had presented the African case on behalf of the 32-state Organization of African Unity (OAU). Such feelings were immediately vented at the August conference of OAU foreign ministers in Dakar which adopted a resolution "deploring" the stand taken by the US, UK, and France during the debates. However, official and even press reactions in the overwhelming majority of individual African capitals, including those where radical regimes are in power, have not reflected, either at the time or since, heightened antagonism toward the US. Moreover, Ambassador Stevenson's council statements, notably his announcement of the US ban on arms sales to South Africa, won generous plaudits in several countries.

2. Possible serious damage to the US image in Africa was averted by a variety of circumstances operative on this occasion. Most important, probably, was the fact that resolutions concerning both questions were actually adopted even though watered down from their original versions. Had our abstention on the Portuguese territories' resolution--which evoked more unfavorable comment than did our contribution to the defeat of the proposed trade

State Department review completed

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boycott against South Africa--helped to kill it, the political fall-out would surely have been appreciably heavier. Another major consideration was the arms embargo statement, the impact of which was enhanced by judicious timing and the manner of presentation.

3. In addition, we benefited from African preoccupations, at the most critical time, with other, more immediate concerns than the positions we were taking in the Security Council or even the sessions themselves. The Dakar meeting, which provided the African foreign ministers a timely forum for individual and collective self-expression, had become hopelessly bogged down in bitter intramural rivalries and frictions by the time the four emissaries from New York reported to it on 10 August. At the same time, the presence in Dakar of so many foreign ministers and their aides removed from African capitals the very officials most likely to have focused on the US role and formulated some reaction. In many instances, remaining government leaders were more concerned at the time with some national or regional event or situation--e.g., the preoccupation of Guinea with pressing domestic political and economic problems, of Ethiopia and Somalia with the Ogaden situation, and of other East Africans with federation talks.

4. Among all responsible African officials, Sierra Leone's foreign minister, Karefa-Smart, a militant nationalist in an essentially conservative government, was by a wide margin the most voluble in voicing resentment over the US positions. Participating in the debates as one of the four special OAU representatives, he made bluntly critical public remarks after each vote, complete with references to "profits and investments" proving to be more important than rights enshrined in the charter.

5. Other known African reactions at the UN were considerably milder. Neither Ghana's radical Quaison-Sackey nor Morocco's Benhima, who shared in the sponsorship of both resolutions as Security Council members, appeared especially exercised about the US votes or our pre-vote pressures for moderation. Quaison-Sackey betrayed no particular resentment when he indicated to an officer of the US Mission on the eve of the apartheid vote that the sponsors fully expected the boycott paragraph to fail. At the risk of incurring some African resentment themselves, both he and Benhima resisted efforts to get them to deny a separate

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vote on the paragraph or to rewrite it in a way which would have put us in a still more difficult position. After the vote, Quaison-Sackey merely expressed the hope that those who had killed the paragraph through abstention were not planning to export strategic materials of direct military value to South Africa, while voicing "limited appreciation" to the US and others who had supported the amended resolution.

6. The US Mission, however, came away from the sessions feeling that the African UN delegations regarded the US willingness to go along with the ban on arms to South Africa as the bare minimum they could expect. Even while commending Stevenson's speech, many African representatives--e.g., Tunisia's strongly pro-Western Mongi Slim--expressed regret over our unwillingness to take the step to sanctions. Final statements by Africans strongly foreshadowed future demands on the West, particularly the US, for such action at the risk of inviting political retaliation. Subsequent contacts between US representatives and African officials in New York and Africa have only underscored further the latter's sense of determination on both the Portuguese and South African issues.

7. At the Dakar conference, which turned its attention to the UN proceedings only briefly in its closing hours, Karefa-Smart apparently again stood out for the sharpness of his specific criticism of the US, UK, and France. Mongi Slim, on the other hand, reportedly not only dealt less severely with the three Western powers--particularly the US--in his report on the UN proceedings, but also used his influence to soften the language of the condemnatory resolution introduced by the Sudanese.

8. The reporting requested from African capitals at the conclusion of the debates in New York turned up relatively little direct commentary, public or private, by African officials on either the US positions or the sessions as a whole. In no country was a US representative subjected either then or subsequently to anything resembling a formal demarche on our role. Among the few officials heard from, once again it was Karefa-Smart who reacted in the most damaging fashion. On a one-day visit to Freetown for the opening of Parliament on 2 August, he evoked cries of "Shame!" from fellow MPs when he grouped the US, UK, and France as "three colonial powers" which

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had tried unsuccessfully to block Security Council action on Portuguese territories. The only other sharp criticism came, surprisingly, from President Diori of Niger--a UAM state. He bluntly asked our chargé, during a 8 August conversation, why the US had "conspired" with its NATO allies to abstain on the Portuguese resolution, insisting on the need for forceful action by the three Western powers.

9. Official comment in Ghana was limited to putting forth the viewpoint, in which pro-Western civil servants joined, that the US arms embargo, while laudable, would not be sufficient to produce any change in South Africa. In Guinea, the politically important acting foreign minister expressed his personal disappointment over the US abstention on the Portuguese vote, emphasizing African resentment over the presence of US arms in Lisbon's territories. A Somali Foreign Ministry spokesman from whom a reaction was solicited remarked, without elaborating, that "some" African governments were bitter over the US abstention. Liberian President Tubman, in a 1 August press conference, acknowledged that the final Portuguese resolution was milder than the African states had wanted, but then added that the one adopted might actually prove more useful.

10. There were some positive expressions of approval for US positions. Both Nigerian Foreign Minister Wachuku and Tanganyikan Foreign Minister Kambona (still glowing from his recent US visit with Nyerere) voiced deep appreciation to our ambassadors for the statement on South Africa while ignoring our abstention on the Portuguese resolution. In Dar-es-Salaam our embassy gained the general impression that local satisfaction over the arms ban had offset disappointment over the abstention. The embassy in Dahomey, where the UAM had just concluded one of its periodic summit meetings, felt that a majority of UAM leaders understood and perhaps even appreciated US efforts for moderation during the debates. On 12 September the secretary general of Mali's Foreign Ministry--an important official but one generally better disposed to the West than is the regime he serves--expressed appreciation for US statements at the UN and elsewhere condemning apartheid.

11. Coverage of the Security Council sessions by African information media provides further evidence that interest in the proceedings and the US positions was not really very great. While press and radio treatment seems to have ranged from moderate to heavy in about 20 countries, much of this

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was straight reporting without editorial commentary. The only regime--controlled paper which went out of its way to attack US positions strongly was Ben Bella's. Apparently the debates prompted no special criticism of the US in the media of the other principal radicals--Mali, Guinea, Egypt, or even Ghana where US-baiting is standard fare for the pro-Communists who operate Nkrumah's press and radio.

12. One editorial in the controlled Ethiopian press attacked the US and UK for supporting Portugal, citing the US as "heart and soul for those who oppress Africans." Ivory Coast regime media made occasional references to Western indecision but made no major attacks. Some criticism of US positions, mild for the most part, was reported from Nigeria, Tunisia, Congo (Leopoldville), Tanganyika, and the Malagasy Republic. Coverage specifically sympathetic to our stands appeared in papers in Nigeria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

13. African representatives contacted during the past two months at or in connection with the current 18th General Assembly session have continued to be relaxed about the US role last summer while urging strong US support for any new African initiatives on their two priority problems. If anything, our standing with Africans generally has probably improved somewhat over this period, primarily as a result of Portugal's agreement to engage in talks in New York with spokesmen for independent African states. This development, which has raised African hopes that Salazar may finally be ready to make some meaningful concessions, has been widely viewed as a direct outgrowth of Under Secretary Hall's August-September visits to Lisbon. In addition, our support for the apartheid resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 11 October is reported to have "delighted" African delegations. At this point it seems clear that the Africans are expecting still greater things from the US as both questions again move toward early consideration in the Security Council.

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